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Abstract 
 
We address the problem of how to provide 
guarantees to a user that an automatically generated 
composition of independently developed web services 
meets the non-functional requirements (NFR). The 
user-specified NFR are in the form of hard constraints. 
We introduce an automata-based model for 
representing and reasoning about non-functional 
requirements for verifying the conformance to NFR. 
The approach described here enables this verification 
by lifting the NFR analysis from the level of individual 
services to the level of the search space of candidate 
compositions obtained from the functional 
requirements. The proposed approach can 
accommodate the different subsets of NFR for different 
components of a composite service. We introduce three 
different strategies when multiple NFRs exist and 
analyze their relative advantages and disadvantages 
under different scenarios. We present results which 
show that this approach to verifying the NFR can 
support efficient re-verification of web-service 
compositions whenever NFR are updated. The 
approach described here has been applied in service 
composition based on NFR in an Emergency 
Management System.   
 
1. Introduction 
 
     While a variety of practical mechanisms has been 
deployed for synthesizing composite services taking 
into consideration their desired functional requirements 
[1][2], the handling of non-functional requirements 
(NFR) is still largely ad-hoc, informal and difficult to 
verify. Among the difficulties are that NFRs may be 
ambiguously defined by the user or that there may be 
inconsistencies among the NFRs specified by the user.  
     While functional requirements describe how a 
system should behave during operation, NFRs describe 
constraints on the quality attributes of the system’s 
operation.  NFR can be broadly classified as soft and 
hard constraints. Hard constraints refer to the set of 
NFRs that must be satisfied by a composite service, 
while soft constraints deal with user preferences and 
trade-offs among NFRs [3].  
Automata-based NFR Representation and Analysis. 
This paper shows how an automatically generated 
composition of independently developed web service 
can be shown to meet the NFRs imposed by the user as 
hard constraints. The approach described here enables 
this verification by lifting the NFR analysis from the 
level of individual services to the level of the search 
space of candidate compositions obtained from the 
functional requirements.   
The verification process introduced in this paper, 
assumes the existence of a search space containing all 
the candidate service compositions that satisfy the 
functional requirements. The functional composition 
algorithms can be found in [9] and will not be 
described here.  
In our setting, a composition of services is 
represented as an automaton where states represent the 
services participating in the composition, inter-state 
transitions represent composition between the services 
at the source and destination states, and labels on 
transitions represent the predicate set of all the non-
functional attributes of the services connected via the 
transition.   
Automata are also used to represent NFRs. The 
predicates in the NFR automata are set true by the 
participating services during the verification process. 
The problem of whether a composition conforms to 
a desired NFR is addressed by synchronously 
composing the automaton representing the service 
composition with the automaton representing the 
corresponding NFR. The composition is said to satisfy 
the NFR if and only if the sequence of properties over 
non-functional attributes as represented by the NFR-
automata is also present in the automaton of the 
composition.  
Introducing Scopes in NFR Automata. In many 
situations, a user imposes a certain NFR not on the 
entire composition but only on a subset of the services 
participating in the composition. To accommodate 
different subsets of NFRs for different components of a 
composite service we introduce the notion of scoping. 
To achieve this we incorporate auxiliary scoping 
information in the property automata as described in 
Sect. 4.1. 
Liveness as Safety NFRs. An automata-based 
property model can represent both safety and liveness 
properties [4][5], where a safety property is of the form 
“a program never enters an undesirable state” and a 
liveness property is of the form “a program eventually 
enters a desirable state”. To achieve compositional 
verification of the NFR properties we introduce a way 
of handling liveness properties by converting them to 
safety properties via use of an additional trap state, 
described in Section 4.2.   
If a state violating a safety property is encountered 
during composition or if a state satisfying a liveness 
property is not reached in any branch, we say that the 
current candidate service composition in the search 
space violates the NFR. Verification Strategies. We 
also present three different strategies (Sect. 5) for 
verifying the conformance when multiple NFRs exist 
and analyzing their relative advantages and 
disadvantages. Specifically, the three strategies are: 
independent composition (INC), where the product of 
each NFR-automaton and the composition automaton 
is performed separately; big-bang composition (BBC), 
where the product of the NFR-automata and the 
composition automaton is computed in one shot; and 
two-stage composition (TSC), where the product of all 
the NFR-automata is first computed and stored, and 
only then is the product of the combined properties and 
the composition automaton computed.  
We show that different strategies are helpful in 
different composition scenarios, e.g. to maximize reuse 
or to quickly identify inconsistencies in the NFRs. We 
show how to analyze the trade-offs among the three 
strategies before verification by pre-computing which 
strategy will be most efficient for specific sets of 
properties.  For example, we show that INC and BBC 
are more efficient when verifying large and complex 
properties for few candidate service compositions in 
the search space. TSC is more efficient for handling 
small, simple properties with a large number of 
candidate service compositions since it maximizes 
reuse across the verification process. 
Case Study. We apply the approach described here 
to the NFRs of an Emergency Management System 
(EMS) [6] example to illustrate the technique and the 
different verification strategies. Results presented here 
show that our approach to verifying the NFRs can 
reuse intermediate results to re-verify web-service 
compositions as the NFRs are updated.  We lift the 
NFR analysis from the level of individual services 
during composition time to the level of the search 
space of candidate compositions obtained from the 
functional requirements. With this separation of 
concerns, we are able to separate the NFR analysis 
from the initial functional web service composition. 
This separation both simplifies the analysis of the EMS 
and allows reusability of intermediate results during 
composition since the functional requirements and 
NFRs can evolve independently. 
Such separation of functional and nonfunctional 
requirements is also useful because for most 
commercial web services the functional requirements 
remain fairly constant while the non-functional 
requirements may be different for each individual 
customer. In this case, all candidate compositions 
matching the functional requirements can be pre-
computed and stored in a search space. When a new 
NFR(s) is provided by a new customer, or updated by 
an existing customer, the service provider is able to 
identify which of the candidate compositions already 
known to satisfy the functional requirements also 
satisfy the customer’s new NFRs.     
   The contributions of this paper are: 
1. The introduction of an automata-based non-
functional requirements model for verifying web 
service compositions. 
2. The integration of scoping information into the 
automata model to handle different subsets of NFRs 
and the introduction of the trap state to verify 
liveness properties.  
3. The presentation and tradeoff analysis of three 
alternative strategies for verifying multiple 
properties.  
The rest of the paper is organized as following.  
Section 2 describes related work on web service 
composition and nonfunctional requirements. Section 3 
gives an overview of our approach and introduces the 
EMS illustrative example used in the rest of the paper. 
Section 4 and Section 5 show how to model and verify 
the NFR properties, respectively.  Section 6 discusses 
the verification of multiple properties by means of the 
three alternative strategies. Section 7 applies our 
approach to an excerpt from the EMS. Section 8 
provides a brief conclusion. 
 
2. Related Work 
 
Most web service composition approaches focus on 
satisfying the user’s functional requirements (see, e.g., 
[1][2]). The work reported here builds on model-based 
verification to also consider NFRs. Foster, Uchitel, 
Magee and Kramer describe a model-based approach 
(LTSA-WS) to verify composition implementations 
[7]. The verification mechanism is a trace equivalence 
check, which composes labeled transition systems 
(LTS) based on pre-constructed finite state process  
models. Rao, Kungas and Matskin introduce a method 
for semantic web service composition based on Linear 
Logic theorem proving [8]. All functional and non-
functional requirements are translated into propositions 
in the logical axioms and then processed by theorem 
prover. However, the Linear Logic prover cannot 
guarantee acceptable computation efficiency when 
there are a large number of functional/non-functional 
constraints on the required system. 
      We build on previous work by Pathak, Basu and 
Honavar, who introduced a tool-supported approach 
(MoSCoE) for composing new services with existing 
ones according to the user requirements [9]. The goal 
of the composition and the component services are all 
represented as LTS automata. A forward-backward 
web service composition algorithm constructs a service 
composition that satisfies the goal automata by 
selecting appropriate component services in the 
repository. It considers some non-functional 
constraints but makes several simplifying assumptions. 
First, all non-functional constraints must be 
represented by a single threshold. Second, only non-
functional constraints that can be calculated by 
arithmetic computations are handled (e.g., overall cost 
of the services or total service delay). These 
assumptions limit the power of the algorithm to handle 
NFRs.  In this paper we model the NFRs as automata 
and verify both non-functional properties and 
functional behavior through automata composition.  
Several researchers have discussed NFRs in the 
context of Quality of Service (QoS). Jaeger, Rojec-
Goldmann and Muhl describe QoS aggregation for web 
service composition using workflow patterns [10]. 
Zeng et al. use a QoS model with linear programming 
techniques to achieve the optimal dynamic service 
composition against the QoS requirements [11].  
However, QoS approaches cannot handle broader 
NFRs. Another approach to composite web service 
verification is context-based matching, including 
syntactic matching and semantic matching, in order to 
ensure compliance of the composition to the functional 
and non-functional requirements [12][13]. 
    Existing approaches to NFR in web service 
composition are limited in their representational power 
and the efficiency of the verification. Our technique 
tries to improve the representational power by 
modeling NFRs in automata and tries to improve the 
efficiency of verifying multiple properties by pre-
selecting the optimal composition strategy. 
 
3. Overview 
 
     Figure 1 provides an overview of our NFR 
verification process.  
 
Figure 1. Process diagram of NFR verification 
 
    We first translate the user-defined NFRs into formal 
automata properties and incorporate the scoping 
information (described in 4.1). We then convert 
liveness properties into safety properties to allow a 
uniform verification process. After that, we pre-
compute which of several alternate verification 
strategies will fit the properties better.  With the chosen 
verification algorithm, we then verify a candidate 
service composition from the pre-constructed search 
space of compositions meeting the functional 
requirements against the NFRs. If the verification fails, 
we find the next candidate service composition and 
iterate. If we run out of all service compositions in the 
search space, we report to the user that the verification 
failed, i.e., that the NFRs are not satisfied by any 
composition in the search space. If the candidate 
service composition is successfully verified by the 
algorithm, we output this candidate as the final result 
to the user.  
       We constructed a small system, the Emergency 
Management System (EMS), based on [6], to illustrate 
the basic concepts of our approach. EMS consists of 
several different units: the Field Officer Service, the 
Request Dispatch Service (Dispatcher for short) and 
services for emergency handling, including Ambulance 
Dispatch Service, Fire Truck Dispatch Service and 
Police Dispatch Service. The functional requirements 
are to dispatch ambulance(s), fire truck(s) and police to 
a location upon request. These requests are specified 
and sent by the Field Officer through a service in a 
mobile terminal or a PDA. The Dispatcher then assigns 
the request an electronic certificate. With this 
certificate, the requested ambulances and police are 
authorized for dispatch upon availability by the Field 
Officer’s communicating with the services of the 
corresponding departments. Two NFRs used in this 
example are:  
1. Every selected Ambulance Dispatch Service 
should have an average response time of less than 
ten minutes (Figure 2 shows this NFR). 
2. When a Field Officer requests an ambulance, 
eventually an ambulance from the same 
jurisdiction (city, county) as the Field Officer shall 
be summoned.  
4. Property Modeling 
 
4.1 Automaton Extension for Property 
Modeling 
Definition 1:    A finite state automata is a tuple FSA = 
(S, s0, Δ, P, F) where S is the finite set of states, s0 א S 
is the start state, and Δ ك S × 2P × S is the transition 
relation of the form s − ߶− > sᇱ such that s, sᇱ  א S, and 
߶ א 2P is a subset of propositions P. Finally, F كS is 
the set of final states. A finite sequence is said to be 
accepted by the FSA if and only if the sequence starts 
from s0 and terminates in any of the final states in F. 
NFR and compositions are described using FSA.  
     A property specification pattern is a generalized 
description of a commonly occurring requirement on 
the sequences of permissible propositions on the 
transitions of a finite–state model [14]. However, in the 
web service composition, a NFR may refer only to the 
properties or behaviors of some services. For example, 
in the EMS, the Field Officer may only impose a 
response time requirement on the ambulance but not on 
the police.  
    We incorporate scoping information into the 
automata properties to handle such situations. A scope 
of a property is a user-defined subset of the services 
and their interactions. The extension introduces a 
special guard over source states or target states using 
the reference keyword “Source” or “Target”. The 
transitions with such guards are only enabled when the 
source (respectively, target) state satisfies the guard.  
 
 
Figure 2. Transition guard with constraint on the 
service attributes 
 
4.2 Efficient Analysis of Liveness as Safety 
Properties 
We are concerned with the representation of both 
safety properties and liveness properties. A safety 
property is of the form “a program never enters an 
undesirable state” and a liveness property of the form 
“a program eventually enters a desirable state” [4][5]. 
The undesirable state in the safety property is labeled 
as a trap state, π  [4].  In Section 3, the first NFR is a 
safety property and the second NFR is a liveness 
property. 
Conversion of liveness properties to safety 
properties via a trap state. We introduce a new way to 
uniformly handle properties by converting liveness 
properties to safety properties via use of an additional 
trap state. We introduce a termination message “#T” 
which indicates the end of the service composition in 
the search space. A liveness property automaton can be 
translated into an equivalent safety property 
automaton, given the termination message “#T”. For 
example, for the liveness property in the second NFR 
in Sect. 3, we translate it into a safety property (Figure 
3) by creating a trap state that captures all the 
executions that have not reached the termination state 
when the service ends.  
    The transitions in the property automaton shown in 
Figure 3 are triggered by the true predicates that appear 
in the service composition. The property automaton 
can only be initiated by the Field Officer Service in 
State 1. When it detects this service, it records the 
location of the “Officer” and goes to State 2. State 2 
can be triggered by the service Ambulance Dispatch 
Service and requires that its location be the same (i.e., 
the same jurisdiction) as the recorded location for the 
Field Officer. At this point there are two cases. If the 
automaton reaches the end State 3, the property is 
successfully verified for the target service composition. 
If the service composition detects #T and the 
automaton has reached the trap state, the verification 
has failed.  
     To summarize, the verification algorithm consists of 
the following stages. Given a candidate service 
composition and a property automaton:  
1. Convert every liveness property into a safety 
property.   
2. Calculate the product of the service composition 
automaton and the property automaton.  
3. If a trap state in a safety property is reached during 
composition, return failure. Otherwise return 
success.  
We next describe the composition algorithms.  
1
2
[Source==Officer] x= 
Source.Location
3
Source== Ambulance 
&& Source.Location ==x
Source!=Ambulance
Source!= 
Officer
π
Source== Ambulance
&& Source.Location 
!=x  || #T
#T
 
Figure 3. Sample safety property for EMS 
5. Automata Composition 
 
    In our approach all automata compositions are 
synchronous, i.e., multiple automata can make progress 
in parallel for each step [15]. The problem of whether a 
composition conforms to a desired NFR is addressed 
by calculating the synchronous product of automata 
representing the composition with those representing 
the corresponding NFR. The composition is said to 
satisfy the NFR if and only if the sequence of 
properties over non-functional attributes as represented 
by the NFR-automata is also present in the automaton 
of the composition. The verification process can be 
viewed as an equivalence check. 
 The left side of Figure 4 shows the search space of a 
service composition. Each branch represents a different 
candidate service composition under the functional 
requirement constraints, with each state being a 
component web service. The right side of Figure 4 is 
an NFR property automaton. The guards on the 
transitions in both sides represent subsets of the 
propositions. The difference is that a proposition subset 
on a transition in the search space automaton on the 
left represents all true predicates related to the source 
service and target service of the transition. On the other 
hand, the proposition subset on a transition in the NFR 
property on the right represents all the user-specified 
non-functional constraints which are pending to verify.  
 
Figure 4. The search space and the NFR property 
 
Definition 2:    Given two automata, FSAi = (Si, s0i, Δi, 
Pi, Fi), for i א  {1, 2}, their product is another FSA 
denoted by FSA1 × FSA2 = (S12, s012, Δ12, P12, F12), 
where S12 ك S1 × S2, s012 = (s01, s02), P12 = P1 ׫ P2, F12 = 
{(s1, s2) | s1 א F1, s2 א F2}. Finally, s1− ߶1 − > sᇱ1  א Δ1 
and s2− ߶2 − > sᇱ2  א Δ2 and (s1, s2) − ߶1  ר ߶2 − > (sᇱ1, 
sᇱ2)  א Δ12.    Taking the left branch of the left side of 
Figure 4 as the candidate composition, the product of 
this candidate composition and the NFR property is 
shown in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5. Product of two automata 
 
6. Handling Multiple Properties 
 
6.1 Verifying Multiple Properties 
    In real-world web service composition, there often 
exists more than one user specified non-functional 
requirements. An interesting issue is how to handle the 
multiple property automata efficiently. Given a 
candidate composition from the search space, the most 
straight-forward way to verify each property automata 
is to verify the properties independently one by one. 
This strategy, Independent Composition (INC), is 
shown in the first column in Table 1.  A disadvantage 
of INC is that even if the properties are inconsistent, 
such that no composition can satisfy them all, the 
algorithm has to explore the entire search space before 
telling the user that no composition satisfies the NFR.  
Table 1: Three algorithms of verification on multiple properties 
 
Algorithm Independent Composition Two-Stage Composition Big-Bang Composition 
Pseudo-
Code 
1. For each candidate 
composition si in S 
1) For each property pj in P 
2) Verify this property by 
calculating s i × pj 
3) If the verification failed, 
jump to the next s i 
4) End For Each 
2. Output s i and terminate 
3. End For Each 
4. Output “No composition 
satisfies the NFR” 
 
1. Take automata q = p0 
2. For j = 1 to k 
3. Calculate q × pj and Save the result 
as q 
4. If there exists only one 
termination state in q and it’s a 
trap state in the safety property, 
Output “Property pj is Inconsistent 
with the other properties” and 
Terminate 
5. End For 
6. For each candidate composition si 
in S 
7. Verify the property by calculating  
s i ×q 
8. If the verification failed, jump to 
the next s i 
9. Else Output s i and terminate 
10. End For Each 
11. Output “No composition satisfies 
the NFR 
1. For each candidate 
composition si in S 
2. Verify the property by 
calculating  s i × p 1 × p 2 ×…× p 
n. All automata are composed 
synchronously rather than 
pair‐wisely. When a trap state 
is reached, the composition 
terminates and returns 
failure. 
3. If the verification failed, try 
the next s i 
4. Else Output s i and terminate 
5. End For Each 
6. Output “No composition 
satisfies the NFR” 
 
Worst 
Complexity 
O(∑ ∑ ሺ|ݏ௜| ൈ |݌௝|ሻ௝௜ ) O(∑ ሺ|ݏ௜|௜ୀ௡ଵ ൈ ሺ∏ |݌݆
݆ൌ݇
1 |ሻሻሻ  O(∑ ሺ|ݏ௜|
௜ୀ௡
ଵ ൈ ∏ |݌݆
݆ൌ݇
1 |ሻሻ 
S is the set of all compositions.  S = {s1, s2, s3, …..sn} 
n is the number of compositions in the search space 
P is the set of all NFRs. P = {p1, p2, p3, …..pn} 
k is the number of NFRs 
 
 
To overcome this weakness of the INC algorithm, 
we introduce the Two-Stage Composition (TSC) 
algorithm (the second column of Table 1) which 
detects property inconsistency before performing the 
verification. TSC composes all property automata into 
one combined property automaton prior to verification. 
In this way, the first inconsistency found during 
property composition will terminate the verification 
process and the property automata causing this failure 
will be captured and returned to the user for possible 
modification of the NFR. 
INC calculates each property independently with the 
candidate composition and discards the intermediate 
calculation results after each inner loop. TSC is instead 
designed to reuse the combined and consistent 
properties across candidate compositions during 
verification. 
A third strategy, the Big-Bang Composition (BBC) 
algorithm, replaces the sequential verification of the 
properties in INC with parallel verification (the third 
column in Table 1). BBC composes all the automata 
including the candidate service composition and the 
property automata synchronously so that the earliest 
reachable trap state in any of the properties can 
terminate the verification by returning a failure. 
 
6.2 Comparative Evaluation 
For one candidate service composition s in the 
search space S, the complexity of the three 
composition algorithms in terms of the number of 
states visited in the property automaton ݌௝ is: 
Independent Composition (INC): O (∑ ሺ|ݏ| ൈ |݌௝|ሻ௝ ) 
Two-Stage Composition (TSC): O (|s|× ∏ |݌݆
௝ୀ௞
ଵ |) 
Big-Bang Composition (BBC): O (|s|× ∏ |݌݆
௝ୀ௞
ଵ |) 
INC. To pre-determine which strategy is more 
efficient to apply, we calculate ∑ |݌݆|
௝ୀ௞
ଵ  and ∏ |݌݆|
௝ୀ௞
ଵ . 
If the sum of the number of states in the property 
automata is less than the product of the number of 
states in the property automata, we select INC to verify 
the properties. Otherwise, we select either BBC or 
TSC.  For example, if there are two properties with two 
and three states, respectively, by calculating ∑ |݌݆|
௝ୀ௞
ଵ  
we know the sum of the states is 2+3=5. However, 
∏ |݌݆|
௝ୀ௞
ଵ =2×3 will only give an upper bound. Because 
the automata composition process prunes unreachable 
states and merges the same predicates, the composite 
automata will always have 6 or fewer states.  
TSC. Composing all properties first in TSC has 
merits in verification. It can identify inconsistent NFRs 
before verification and quickly locate which property 
automaton caused the inconsistency. Thus, the user can 
get quick feedback to help in refining a failed NFR. In 
addition, TSC can assist with efficient verification. 
Since property automata may share the same predicates 
on the transitions, the more predicates shared by the 
property automata, the fewer states the combined 
automaton will have.   Another advantage of using 
TSC is that the combined property automata can be 
reused to verify multiple candidate service 
compositions. Since the other two algorithms don’t 
reuse the computation results at all, it will be more 
efficient than the other two algorithms if the number of 
candidate service compositions is large enough. 
However, we cannot precisely predict this threshold 
beforehand. 
    BBC. For a single candidate service composition 
automaton, BBC is more efficient than TSC. 
Composing all the properties ahead of verification as in 
TSC can result in state explosion in the combined 
property automaton when properties are not related.  
Composing the candidate service composition 
automaton with the property automata, on the other 
hand, will reduce the number of states by pruning the 
violated branches during verification and can terminate 
the verification sooner by reaching the nearest trap 
state in all properties.  BBC is thus appropriate for 
handling cases where there are only a few candidate 
compositions with more complex properties. 
     A combined strategy is for the user to pre-set a 
constant number k of candidate compositions as a 
switch point for the algorithms. If the verification starts 
with INC or BBC and fails on candidate compositions 
k times, the verification process switches to use TSC 
on the rest of the candidate compositions. This 
constant k can be determined by multiple simulations 
or by historical data on the server of the web service 
provider. 
    Generally speaking, INC and BBC focus more on 
the refinement of the design, which regulates the 
candidate composition, because they can detect the 
insufficiencies of the candidate compositions quickly. 
TSC focuses more on the refinement of the user non-
functional requirement, because it can more quickly 
locate any inconsistencies in NFRs. 
 
7. Application 
 
     We applied the approach described here to the EMS 
example to evaluate which algorithm is best for this 
application. Figure 6 shows the search space; our goal 
is to verify a web service composition in it against the 
two NFRs described in Section 3 (the Time Constraint 
with two states and the Location Constraint with four 
states) simultaneously. (The two NFR automata are not 
shown here due to space limitations.) We then translate 
the liveness property of the Time Constraint into a 
safety property automaton with three states by 
following the steps in section 4.2.  
 
Figure 6. Example search space for EMS 
application 
 
     The two property automata now have three states 
and four states, respectively, summing to seven states. 
Figure 7 shows the combined properties (the Time 
Constraint and the Location Constraint). As we can 
see, it contains 6 states. Following the process 
described in 6.1, we pre-compute ∑ |݌݆|
௝ୀ௞
ଵ  = 7 and 
∏ |݌݆|
௝ୀ௞
ଵ  = 6.  Since the number of compositions n=2 
in this example, the INC algorithm uses 2*3* (3+4) = 
42 calculations to verify the two properties whereas 
TSC uses 2*3*6+3*4=48 calculations (3*4 is the cost 
of combining the two properties). BBC, on the other 
hand, requires 2*3*3*4= 72 calculations. With two 
candidate compositions, applying INC saves 12.5% of 
the total verification time compared to TSC and 41.6% 
compared to BBC. 
However, if there were more candidates in the search 
space, the decision is different. For n candidates, 
applying the INC verification strategy to each 
candidate composition requires n*3*7 calculation steps 
while TSC uses n*3*6+3*4 calculations. BBC, on the 
other hand, requires n*3*4 calculations in the worst 
case. We can see that, because of the reuse of the 
combined property automaton in the TSC algorithm, 
when there are more than four candidates in the search 
space, TSC will have better efficiency than INC and 
BBC for this example. 
 
Figure 7. Combined property automaton 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
To enhance verification of non-functional 
requirements in web service compositions, we have 
introduced an innovative approach that lifts the NFR 
analysis from the level of individual services during 
composition time to the level of the search space of 
candidate compositions obtained from the functional 
requirements.  By lifting the level of the concern, we 
separated NFR analysis from functional web service 
composition. Thus, the specification of NFR for the 
web service composition is not entangled with the 
specification of functional requirements. This 
separation supports a divide-and-conquer strategy in 
which each stage can be studied separately and then be 
merged for improved efficiency. Separation also 
enhances the reusability of intermediate verification 
results during composition, since the functionalities 
designed for commercialized web services are much 
more stable than the users’ NFRs.  
Our approach to verifying the NFRs can make 
existing functional web service compositions easier to 
reuse and re-verify as NFRs are updated.  The 
contributions of this paper include introduction of an 
automata-based non-functional requirements model for 
verifying web service compositions, integration of 
scoping information into the automata model, three 
different strategies to handle multiple NFRs and a 
tradeoff analysis of the three strategies for better 
performance. 
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